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Relevant Data Properties**

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# Scrutinizing Privacy in Multi-Omics Research: How To Provide Ethical Grounding for the Identification of Privacy-Relevant Data Properties<sup>1</sup>

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The outline of a framework for assessing privacy risks in multi-omic research and databases provided by Dupras and Bunnik is a valuable contribution to the literature on the ethics of omics data. They provide an empirically informed list of privacy-relevant omic data properties that help us to better understand the variety of privacy risks involved and present three steps that one can follow in order to assess “data properties and interrelation effects between omic types for the detection of privacy risks in multi-omic research and databases” (Dupras and Bunnik 2021, 2). In our commentary, we take a step back to discuss their framework in light of the normativity of the concept of privacy. We start by scrutinizing the underlying premise of normative-neutrality in the authors’ approach, subsequently show how a normative understanding of privacy would collapse the distinctions that they attempt to make between ‘intrinsic’ properties, ‘extrinsic’ factors & contextual factors and end by proposing a new and primary step to ethically ground their framework.

Dupras & Bunnik write that their “model does not make any normative claims about privacy itself, i.e. about the acceptability or unacceptability of privacy risks, or about the proper level of data protection required for the responsible conduct of biological or health research” (Dupras and Bunnik 2021, 12). However, as privacy itself is a normative concept, the (non)acceptability of privacy risks and an assessment of the proper level of data protection do not exhaust the relevant normative claims. This becomes clear in the authors’ cited broad definition of privacy as “freedom from unauthorized intrusion,” because, to have an understanding of what constitutes an intrusion, one is required to make a normative claim about what privacy is (Dupras and Bunnik 2021, 3). Because the authors do not explicitly problematize this argumentative step, they are implicitly working with a normative understanding of what constitutes private information and thus are attempting to use a normative concept in a neutral way. In practice, this attempt can be seen in their evaluation of various omic data properties in their Table 1 (Dupras and Bunnik 2021, 8).

To illustrate the importance of making the normativity of privacy explicit, we start by analyzing two examples of omic data properties from the authors’ Table 1. When considering whether the data property in question conveys observable phenotypic information, the authors do not comment on the data property’s impact on the level of data sensitivity. But given that epigenomic information has the potential to improve the accuracy of facial portraits made on the basis of genomic data, we could imagine cases where a person does not want his or her former phenotypic information to become known because they have had plastic surgery to repair damage caused by an accident (Dupras and Bunnik 2021, 11). Another example from this table concerns whether a data property is determined (in part) by acts or behaviors conceived as willful, but here

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3 the authors do not comment on the impact that this property has on identifying power. Yet, if the  
4 acts or behaviors in question can be linked to a particular type of behavior, then the data property in  
5 question has impact on identifying power. For example, one can use high-resolution mass  
6 spectrometry (HRMS) to determine whether a person uses illicit drugs. This affects the impact of the  
7 data property on identifying power because one could then be on the lookout for people who use  
8 illicit drugs. In both examples, one is making normative claims about what constitutes a possible  
9 violation of privacy. But to make these types of judgements, one requires a normative understanding  
10 of human life (1) and an understanding of the case-specific capacity of data to represent information  
11 about human life (2).<sup>6</sup> Explicitly introducing these requirements to the authors' framework would  
12 ethically ground their framework and subsequently improve its capacity to judge the privacy-  
13 relevance of omic data properties  
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16 At this point in our argument, the authors could object by saying that these two  
17 requirements would necessitate an introduction of 'extrinsic' or contextual factors into their analysis,  
18 whereas they wanted to restrict themselves to 'intrinsic' data properties. Quite forcefully, they argue  
19 that:  
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21 "...the most important contribution of our case-example comparison of privacy risks in  
22 genomics versus epigenomics is a better understanding of the role of 'intrinsic' omic data  
23 properties (i.e., properties associated with the type of biological variants under scrutiny) can  
24 play in raising or increasing some privacy risks." (Dupras and Bunnik 2021, 2)  
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26 However, the authors themselves note that making this distinction is difficult:  
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28 "We find important to acknowledge here that it is very difficult – and possibly impractical –  
29 to draw clear-cut boundaries between intrinsic data properties and extrinsic factors which  
30 may also increase (re)identification risks and the level of sensitivity of the information  
31 potentially conveyed. For instance, [...] when trying to distinguish abnormal from normal or  
32 disruptive from adaptive (or neutral) biological variants, complex questions may arise relating  
33 to the definition and meaning of concepts such as "disorder" or "disease."" (Dupras and  
34 Bunnik 2021, 11)  
35

36 Here, we would like to push the authors' train of thought one step further because we believe that  
37 adopting a normative notion of privacy necessitates the collapse of the boundaries between  
38 'intrinsic' data properties, 'extrinsic' factors and contextual factors. To even start to identify what  
39 they consider to be 'intrinsic' omic data properties and put them on the list of privacy-relevant omic  
40 data properties, one must already involve the two requirements that we mentioned above, namely a  
41 normative understanding of human life (1) and an understanding of the case-specific capacity of data  
42 to represent information about human life (2). Let us look at another omic data property from their  
43 Table 1: whether the data property is determined (in part) by acts or behaviors conceived as willful.  
44 To identify this property as privacy-relevant, one already has to conceptualize people as beings with  
45 the power to determine their own course of action (1) and understand that epigenetic information  
46 has the capacity to model information that is determined (in part) by acts or behaviors conceived as  
47 willful (2). The same holds true for less obvious data properties mentioned in their Table 1, such as  
48 whether a data property is ubiquitous among cell types and tissues. As the authors write:  
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51 "High ubiquity (e.g. genotype ubiquity) increases the likelihood that sensitive information  
52 (e.g. high risk to breast cancer) can be revealed by cell types or tissues which are neither  
53 functionally relevant to the particular information (e.g., saliva sample), nor the primary  
54 research object." (Dupras and Bunnik 2021, 8)  
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59 <sup>6</sup> For a defense of these two requirements in the context of business ethics & economic theory, see (Safarlou  
60 2021).

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3 This explanation implicitly utilizes a normative understanding of human life due to the common  
4 knowledge that information about a high risk for cancer is sensitive information for any human  
5 being's life (1) and includes a description of the capacity of data to represent information about  
6 human life by means of its explanation of how cell types or tissues can reveal sensitive information  
7 (2). Consequently, because privacy itself is a normative concept, and a normative understanding of  
8 human life (1) and an understanding of the case-specific capacity of data to represent information  
9 about human life (2) form prerequisites for identifying the privacy-relevant omic data properties that  
10 are listed by the authors, the distinctions between 'intrinsic' properties, 'extrinsic' factors and  
11 contextual factors cannot be drawn and collapse.  
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14 We do not believe that the collapse of these distinctions poses a fundamental problem for  
15 the framework that the authors propose. Identifying privacy-relevant data properties that are  
16 described on a level that is closely associated with the type of biological variants under scrutiny is still  
17 highly valuable for the reasons the authors mention (Dupras and Bunnik 2021, 2–3). However, one  
18 cannot do so while conceptualizing omic data properties by means of the aforementioned  
19 distinctions and while using a conception of privacy that is treated as neutral with respect to what  
20 intrusions are. Instead, we would encourage them to ethically ground their framework by fully  
21 integrating it with a normative conception of privacy.  
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24 Consequently, we propose that a new and primary step should be included in their  
25 framework in order to explicitly tackle the aforementioned argumentative step that has to be made  
26 from data to privacy-relevance (in essence, from fact to value). Formulated as a question: "What can  
27 this data potentially tell us about a person's life?"<sup>7</sup> This question would be answered by going over  
28 the first column in their Table 1, potentially adding new entries to the list, and then writing "Yes" or  
29 "No" in the second column. Adding this step to their framework has several positive consequences.  
30 First of all, introducing this step helps to solve the argumentative lacuna that is mentioned in the  
31 beginning of this commentary (the lack of an explicit recognition of the normative claims made with  
32 respect to the normativity of privacy itself). Secondly, explicitly reflecting on whether there are any  
33 new privacy-relevant omic data properties stimulates the model's desired flexibility in a still-growing  
34 research area (Dupras and Bunnik 2021, 13). Thirdly, it bolsters the authors' case against genetic  
35 exceptionalism by calling for an explicit reflection on the informative value of data (as such) about  
36 human life and thus treating all data equally from the outset, without making a special or  
37 metaphysical exception for genetic data (Dupras and Bunnik 2021, 2).  
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60 <sup>7</sup> The authors formulate their steps as questions in the last section of their paper (Dupras and Bunnik 2021, 13).